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A Cardiac Implantable Medical device (IMD) is a device, which is surgically implanted into a pa-
tient’s body, and wirelessly configured using an external programmer by prescribing physicians and
doctors. A set of lethal attacks targeting these devices can be conducted due to the use of vulnera-
ble wireless communication and security protocols, and the lack of security protection mechanisms
deployed on IMDs.
In this paper, we propose a system for postmortem analysis of lethal attack scenarios targeting
cardiac IMDs. Such a system reconciles in the same framework conclusions derived by technical
investigators and deductions generated by pathologists. An inference system integrating a library
of medical rules is used to automatically infer potential medical scenarios that could have led to the
death of a patient. A Model Checking based formal technique allowing the reconstruction of potential
technical attack scenarios on the IMD, starting from the collected evidence, is also proposed. A
correlation between the results obtained by the two techniques allows to prove whether a potential
attack scenario is the source of the patient’s death.
Keywords. Cardiac Implantable Medical Devices, Lethal attacks, Digital investigation, Postmortem
analysis, Formal techniques.
1 Introduction
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) group together medical devices that are surgically implanted into
patient’s body to perform medical therapeutic functions. They are configured using a programmer which
communicates wirelessly with IMDs through the use of the 402-405 MHz Medical Implant Communi-
cation Service (MICS) band [15]. However, the communication protocols used by IMDs to wirelessly
exchange data are insecure. They exhibit a set of security vulnerabilities, including but not limited to, the
use of weak authentication techniques that are vulnerable to brute-force or replay attacks, the exchange
of clear text or weakly encrypted sensitive medical data between the IMD and the programmer, and the
absence of security mechanisms to enforce monitoring and detection of unusual behavior or connections.
All of these vulnerabilities make IMDs unprotected and likely to threat the safety of patients carrying
them. Several possible lethal attacks have been discussed in recent research [6, 2, 13, 14], including, but
are not limited to: a) unauthorized modification of therapy settings; b) repetitive execution of commands
that exhibit high energy consumption and lead to battery depletion; and c) ordering the IMD to deliver
successive electric shocks leading to fatal arrhythmia.
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The existing cardiac IMDs provide a set of digital traces (e.g., electromyogram history, history of
undertaken responses to arrhythmia), which are useful for conducting a postmortem investigation. They
can be interpreted by pathologists to derive some conclusions about the primary cause of death. To the
best of our knowledge, there are no appropriate mathematical or formal analysis techniques that were
developed to conduct a postmortem investigation on these traces.
In this context, it becomes necessary to develop new techniques and methodologies for postmortem
investigation of lethal security incidents on IMDs. The aim is to automatically identify and reconstruct
potential attack scenarios, starting from the evidence collected from IMDs, and prove the causality be-
tween a death of a patient carrying an IMD and an identified potential attack scenario on such an im-
planted device. The need for implementing an investigation technique for IMDs was discussed in [7]. A
cryptographic audit log was proposed to be integrated to an IMD, in addition to the existing logs. That
log allows a secure storage of events related to modification of IMD settings and provides evidential
data for investigators. Authors in [5] highlighted also the need for providing and protecting audit logs.
Authors in [8] have highlighted the need of using an encrypted audit file that logs all access to IMD
settings to identify malicious activities on IMDs. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
methodology or technique of attacks analysis and reconstruction, in the literature, which is appropriate
to the investigation of lethal attacks on IMDs.
Some other works exist in the literature, but are either related to the investigation of digital attacks
on general types of networked systems, or the investigation of physical crime scenes. Authors in [3]
proposed a digital investigation approach, which implements a computation model based on a Finite
State Machine and computer history. This approach allows formulating and verifying hypotheses derived
from the occurred events or states in the provided digital data. Another digital investigation approach
addressing the security attacks on networked systems was presented in [12]. The work proposed a formal
logic-based approach that allows proving and reconstructing potential attack scenarios based on a library
of attacks and the provided evidence. In [9], a decision support system allowing the automation of crime
scenarios reconstruction, was proposed. This system, which addresses physic criminal investigation, is
based on a knowledge driven methodology that instantiates scenarios in forward and backward chaining
starting from a library of stored events. Based on this methodology, a set of plausible scenarios can be
generated according to the provided evidence. Another physical investigation approach, which is based
on a formal theory of reasoning on evidence, was proposed in [1]. It allows the identification of criminal
facts by implementing a hybrid approach of reasoning which integrates the one argument-based approach
and the one story-based approach. This formal theory allows the construction of hypothetical scenarios
in a crime case and the selection of potential scenarios according to the provided arguments. Authors
in [17] developed a systematic approach for modeling crime scenarios in a single Bayesian Network.
The latter network, which represents a formal evidential reasoning based on narrative and probabilistic
methods, enables the development of a software tool improving the communication between experts and
judges in legal cases. An approach to peer review in forensic pathology is reviewed in [16]. In this
approach, the cause of death is identified, not only through the results extracted during autopsy, but also
through a meeting discussion that should be performed by pathologists to validate the cause of death.
In this paper, we propose a digital investigation system for Cardiac IMDs, which allows identifying
and reconstructing potential attack scenarios that caused a patient’s death. A three-step methodology is
proposed, together with a set of techniques to use in each step. First, the methodology helps identifying
the cause of a death based on the medical observations collected by an IMD, including: a) the patient’s
electromyogram (EMG) recorded by the IMD over a period of time before the death; and b) the log file
related to critical reactions undertaken by the IMD (e.g., delivered therapy) to respond to heart-related
emergency situations. An inference system integrating a set of medical rules is proposed. The latter
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allows identifying the potential medical scenarios source of death of a victim carrying an IMD, through a
backward execution of these rules. Second, based on the access and system logs collected from the IMD
under investigation, which identify the sensitive actions related to access and settings, we reconstruct
the potential technical attack scenarios that would generate the same logs content if they had been really
executed. A library of attacks is used to support the reconstruction, which is done in forward chaining.
Third, having generated two forms of potential scenarios: medical and technical, we correlate the two
scenarios to check the existence of an attack scenario that arguments a patient death.
The paper contribution is four-fold. First, we identify and detail a set of possible lethal attack sce-
narios targeting cardiac IMDs, helping investigators to generate a library of attacks useful for the re-
construction of technical potential scenarios. Second, compared to the existing postmortem investigation
approaches, which are purely medical and based on medical observations collected during an autopsy, our
proposal integrates, in addition to the medical forensic postmortem analysis performed by pathologists,
a digital investigation technique that takes into account the need to identify and reconstruct potential at-
tacks that may have targeted IMDs. To the best of our knowledge, we are proposing the first postmortem
investigation technique of lethal attacks on cardiac IDs that integrates the medical and technical aspect
together within a same framework. Third, the whole majority of techniques described in the proposed
system can be automated thanks to the formal description we have set up, supporting the development
of a medical computer assisted digital investigation tool. Fourth, as the IDs available in the market show
a limitation of storage space and energy resources, they do not allow to log every action executed by
the programmer. The investigation technique we are proposing allows to infer unobservable events and
generate all potential scenarios that are coherent with the available evidence, using a library of known
attacks.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the require-
ments that should be fulfilled by a system for postmortem analysis of lethal attacks on IMDs. Section
3 models and describes attacks threatening IMDs, stressing on the feasibility of generating a library of
IMD attacks and automating the reconstruction of scenarios. In Section 4, we detail the proposed investi-
gation methodology. Section 5 describes the techniques proposed to conduct a postmortem investigation
of lethal attacks on IMDs. In section 6, we provide a case study, to exemplify the proposal. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Requirements for an efficient investigation of attacks on cardiac IMDs
A system for postmortem analysis of lethal attacks on Implantable Medical Devices should fulfill the
following requirements.
First, the postmortem analysis techniques should allow differentiating between natural and criminal
death. They should avoid considering that a death caused by an inappropriate response of an IMD, which
was previously attacked (by modifying its configuration for instance), is a heart attack related death.
Second, authors in [8] have discussed the importance of developing an efficient investigation of
security attacks and faults on IMDs. To do so, a set of accurate and reliable copies of evidence should
be generated by the IMDs and made available for investigation. In this context, at least three types
of evidence should be available: a) traces related to the EMG data collected over a sufficient period
of time preceding the patient’s death. They could allow identifying how and when the patient’s health
deteriorated; b) traces related to the IMD responses each time that it detected an emergency situation
(e.g., fibrillation). They would allow identifying inappropriate responses; and c) traces related to sensitive
activities (e.g., authentication, reconfiguration of therapy parameters) undertaken by remote users on the
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IMD. They help identifying potential malicious attacks that caused the inappropriate responses detected
in the second type of evidence.
Third, as events executed on the IMD are not totally detected and recorded in the evidential traces
provided to investigators (e.g., eavesdropping of the exchanged traffic, logs visualization), a postmortem
analysis should hypothesize missing events, leading to the generation of several potential forms of attack
scenarios. Such a generation could become difficult and complex due to the diversity and complexity of
conducted attack scenarios. Unless a theoretical technique, supporting the automated inference of sce-
narios, is developed and used, such a postmortem analysis could become prone to errors, and sometimes
unable to provide the results within an acceptable time-frame.
Fourth, even if a lethal attack is conducted on an IMD, a technical investigator cannot solely prove
that such an attack is the source of the patient’s death, unless medical experts approve this causality. On
the opposite side, a forensic pathologist cannot prove that a patient death, which is induced by an inap-
propriate response of the IMD, can always be attributed to a criminal modification of the IMD settings.
To overcome this, he can call for technical investigators to help him demonstrating the occurrence of
such malicious events starting from the collected evidence. Therefore, a system for digital investigation
of lethal attacks on IMDs should be able to reconcile in the same framework the conclusions derived by
technical investigators and the conclusions generated by medical experts.
3 Attacks on cardiac Implantable Medical Devices
IMDs are wirelessly configured through an external programmer, using in the great majority of cases
insecure and vulnerable communication protocols. These vulnerabilities are mainly related to the use
of very weak authentication mechanisms, and unencrypted or weakly encrypted sensitive medical data,
which can be exploited by executing replay attacks. In this context, several types of attacks can be
launched on these devices. They can be classified according to their complexity into: simple attacks and
complex attacks.
3.1 Simple attacks
Simple attacks defines the actions that can be performed by an adversary during an attack scenario.
Below, three types of simple attacks are described.
Eavesdropping attacks Since the IMD and the programmer exchange data wirelessly, an attacker can
intercept these data and use it for malicious intent. According to the degree of protection, two types of
attacks can be executed.
• Release of sensitive content: when the exchanged messages are unencrypted, the adversary ana-
lyzes them to discover credentials and extract sensitive data, including, but not limited to, physio-
logical data provided by the EMG, therapy configuration, and history of treatments.
• Traffic analysis: when the exchanged messages are encrypted and secured using the same crypto-
graphic keys and algorithms, some attacks can be used in persistent mode (e.g., brute-force attacks)
to discover the credentials used for authentication, and decrypt the exchanged commands and con-
figurations. The adversary could also try to infer useful information by observing and analyzing
patterns, frequency, size, and forms of the encrypted traffic.
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Unauthorized access to the IMD Having discovered the credentials used for authentication, an adver-
sary can successfully be authenticated to the IMD and thus he can fully access it and gain privileges of
authorized entities (e.g., prescribing physicians). Therefore, several attacks harming patients’ safety and
IMD security can be executed. These attacks are described hereinafter.
• Repetitive electric shocks generation: due to the gained privilege, the adversary can induce the
IMD to deliver a number of successive electric shocks without detection of any type of arrhythmia.
• Log modification: an attacker can modify or even delete data recorded in logs. Such types of
attacks are generally used to hide evidence that help investigators identifying a criminal behavior.
• Clock drifting: to damage the stored history in an IMD, the attacker modifies the IMD’s clock in
such a way that the timestamps in the event log would be misleading, making events correlation
and reconstruction erroneous.
• Therapy modification: an adversary alters the therapy settings or even disables it to, so that the
IMD delivers inappropriate therapy in the future.
Attacking the IMD availability Even if an adversary cannot gain access to the IMD, he may damage
the availability of the IMD by executing several types of Denial of Service attacks. Four types of attacks
are described hereinafter.
• Jamming: by jamming the traffic exchanged between the IMD and the programmer, a physician
would not be able to configure or update the existing configuration of the therapy to be delivered
by the IMD. In the other side, it may become impossible for the physician to collect the IMD’s
logged events using the programmer.
• Replay: if the exchanged messages are encrypted but not different from a session to another, the
attacker can intercept messages from one session and replay them later to open a new session as
a legitimate user or re-execute commands. Moreover, by generating a large volume of replayed
messages, an attacker could overwhelm the IMD resources and drain its battery.
• Repeated access attempts: by sending access attempts several times, the IMD battery could be
drained. In fact, even if the received messages are rejected, the IMD loses energy to analyze every
received request.
• Exploiting software vulnerabilities: an authorized entity, who gained access to an IMD, can re-
motely update the IMD’s software (this feature was discussed in [8]). Therefore, an adversary
can analyze the firmware of the IMD and identify the remote vulnerabilities by which he can send
counterfeit updates or firmware, leading the IMD to not react suitable during emergency.
3.2 Complex attacks
By combining several forms of simple attacks, as described in the previous subsection, complex attack
scenarios can be generated. Some of these attacks could be lethal. These scenarios are depicted in the
graph provided in Figure 1. Every node in this graph specifies the state of the IMD seen throughout the
execution of the attack (e.g., connected users, configuration data, and available quantity) and the health
status of the patient carrying this IMD. These states can be classified into secure and insecure starting
from a list of invariants that can be generated by experts. Two states s1 and s2 in the graph are linked
together, if an action A is executed from s1 leading to the generation of s2. To be executed action the A
should be enabled in the state s1. The automated generation of such a graph could be done starting from
20 Digital Investigation of Security Attacks on Cardiac Implantable Medical Devices
	
 	

 
	
 	
	

 			

	



 	
	

 			







	




	
	







	




 	! "#










 	

 $
 			



 %
	
	

 $
 			

	

 	

 
	
 	
	







Figure 1: Lethal attack scenarios
a library of simple attacks and an initial description of the initial state of the IMD (i.e., the state at which
the IMD started working, or the state identified by the physician during the last medical examination to
be a normal state).
We describe in the following the typical anatomy of a complex attack scenario on an IMD. Generally,
an adversary starts by intercepting and analyzing the exchanged traffic between the IMD and the pro-
grammer to discover credentials used for authentication. Upon discovering them, he tries to gain access
to the IMD by proceeding through authentication. Having gained access, he becomes able to execute
different type of attacks including: a) the execution of inappropriate actions such as forcing the IMD
to deliver electric shocks; b) the modification of the configuration (e.g., clock drifting, logs alteration,
or therapy settings modification); and c) the deactivation of the life-sustaining functions (e.g., updating
the firmware, disabling the therapy). A wide set of examples of lethal attack scenarios can be defined.
Among the most important, we present the following.
Thanks to the use of MICS band, a transmission distance of 10 meters can be achieved between
an IMD and a programmer. An eavesdropper located within this transmission range can intercept the
exchanged traffic between the IMD and the programmer. Based on a known specification of the IMD’s
radio chip and using a software radio platform, the eavesdropper can also conduct a reverse engineering
on the protocol and packet structure used by the IMD to communicate with the programmer. Conse-
quently, as existing IMDs were not made secure for the sake of reduction of energy overhead, an attacker
would be able to discover the used credentials and also to forge packets containing erroneous configu-
ration parameters. An example of this attack was shown in [10] over insulin pumps. Moreover, in [6],
a reverse-engineering of the communication protocol used by an Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator
(ICD) was conducted using an oscilloscope and a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP). A set of
software radio-based attacks, including but are not limited to, replaying of identification data exchanged
between the ICD and the programmer during access, modification of the ICD’s clock, and update of the
therapy settings, was conducted.
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Scenario 1 An attacker intercepts the traffic (we suppose that messages are unencrypted) exchanged
between the IMD and the programmer, and analyzes it to extract credentials and data related to the pa-
tient’s health status and therapy settings. After being successfully authenticated to the IMD, he modifies
the therapy settings, based on the collected information, in such a way that the new configuration would
be unsafe to the patient health. A future occurrence of some types of arrhythmia would be fatal, as the
IMD could respond inappropriately.
A malicious modification of the therapy settings, could consist in replacing the thresholds associated
to the detection of Ventricular Tachycardia (V T ), so that a future occurrence of an Atrial Fibrillation (AF)
will be detected by the IMD as a V T (An example of an inappropriate detection of AF as V T is shown
in [11]). To respond, the IMD will deliver inappropriate responses (e.g., antitachycardia pacing), leading
to the occurrence of successive proarrhythmia events (e.g., V T events). For example, in [11], when the
IMD wrongly detects a V T , it delivered a 5.1-J cardioversion shock followed by a 35.1-J defibrillation
shock. Faced to the latter response, the patient’s heart starts to experience a syncopal V T , leading the
IMD to deliver a new 35.1-J defibrillation shock. This response induces a faster V T , leading the IMD to
deliver a 34.4-J shock, which cause a posterior deceleration. In this scenario, the IMD has exhausted the
maximum energy shocks without correcting the occurred V T . Unless, a precordial thump, is performed
by healthcare professional to correct this arrhythmia, the patient could die.
Scenario 2 In this scenario, we suppose that the exchanged traffic between the IMD and the program-
mer is encrypted. Therefore, even by intercepting this traffic, the adversary would not be able to discover
credentials. If the used cryptographic algorithm and keys are kept unchanged during the whole lifetime
of the IMD, it may be possible for the attacker to conduct a brute force attack in persistent mode and get
the IMD security credentials. After discovering these credentials and being successfully authenticated to
the IMD, he sends commands to the IMD to deliver successive electric shocks, leading to the acceleration
of the patient’s heartbeat which could cause fatal arrhythmia.
Scenario 3 As detailed in the previous scenario, and after the attacker gains access to the IMD, he
disables the life-sustaining functions of the IMD by disabling the configured therapy. After the IMD
becomes inoperative, the occurrence of arrhythmia could cause the patient’s death.
While existing IMDs are not designed to support digital investigation, some of the traces they pro-
vide could be useful for investigation. In fact, by correlating sensitive data collected from logs (e.g.,
modification of therapy parameters, time and nature of responses undertaken by the IMD) with the EMG
recorded by the IMD, an investigator would be able to deduce some lethal attacks. For instance, some
actions in the second scenario could be detected after noticing that several electric shocks were delivered
without any occurrence of arrhythmia.
4 A methodology for postmortem investigation of attacks on cardiac IMDs
In this section, we provide an overview of the evidence that can be collected from IMDs during a post-
mortem investigation, and describe the proposed methodology. A tamper-evident logging mechanism is
supposed to exist on the IMD being investigated, so that the integrity of evidences can be checked before
analysis. In this context, while an eavesdropper can a) capture the exchanged traffic and collect creden-
tials, which are used for authenticating a privileged user (e.g., physician) to the IMD; and b) authenticate
himself from an unauthorized programmer using the discovered authentication credentials; and c) gain
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a privileged access on the IMD; he cannot alter or modify any log file generated on this IMD. An addi-
tional layer of security can be used to guarantee that access to IMD’s logs is only done by an authorized
physician, who can read its content and decide to reduce the size of that file (if it is close the maximum
value) by deleting old and low-severity events generated previously to the last medical consultations.
While a Write Only Memory (WOM) can not be used as a solution as the physician should be able to
read the log history using the same device components, the mutual authentication protocol, which was
proposed in [4], could be applied in such cases to enforce authentication. A set of cardiac sensors could
be connected during remote access to this IMD logs to collect the patient’s electrocardiogram and extract
a biometric key. During the same time the IMD is asked to extract a biometric key from the EMG that it
is monitoring. If the generated key is the same, then authentication is successful.
4.1 Evidence description
Postmortem investigation of attacks targeting Implantable Medical Devices is performed based on a set
of evidence, which can be classified into two technical evidence and medical evidence.
Technical evidence They provide a history of the set of sensitive events that occurred on the IMD
configuration or triggered by the connected users. Examples of provided events include, but are not
limited to, successful and unsuccessful attempts of remote access, modification of the IMD’s clock value,
and alteration of the therapy or firmware. Such a history is typically collected from the IMD log as a
series of time stamped events. It may provide an incomplete and limited description of an attack scenario
conducted by an attacker before the patient’s death, or before inducing the IMD to a denial of service.
Medical evidence They are a set of findings derived by pathologists during investigation based on the
examination of the victim and the carried IMD. These evidence represent: a) the patient’s electromyo-
gram (EMG) which was continually recorded by the IMD over the period of time before the death. Since
the EMG represents the recording of electrical activity of heart muscles, such an evidence allows to
identify a wide set of cardiac anomalies through the observation of the electrical waves (e.g., P wave,
T wave, and R wave) related to the heart activity of the patient before he died; b) the set of reactions
(i.e., the therapy delivery) undertaken by the IMD over time. An IMD reaction is an electric shock that
is delivered to correct a detected arrhythmia. The value of this electric shock, which depends on the type
of detected arrhythmia, is expressed in Joule. These responses, which are time-stamped, can be matched
to the anomalies identified on the EMG; c) the set of clinical observations collected during autopsy, such
as the status of the probe of the implanted device; and d) the set of additional information collected from
the medical record of the dead person (e.g., chronic illness, medications).
4.2 Three-step evidences analysis
We describe in this subsection a three-step methodology of postmortem investigation of lethal attacks on
cardiac IMDs, operated by a group of pathologists and technical investigators.
Medical investigation This step aims at conducting a medical investigation based on the medical ev-
idence (as defined in the previous subsection) collected from the IMD under investigation. A set of
invariants, describing anomalies that a physician can detect on an EMG and a set of unexpected re-
sponses of the IMD under investigation when these anomalies occur, are defined. These invariants allow
to transform an EMG record, together with the traces describing the reactions undertaken by an IMD,
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into a medical timestamped log containing a description of the different forms of sensitive heart-related
events (e.g., ventricular fibrillation and ventricular extrasystole) and the reaction undertaken by the IMD,
if any, for each one of them.
A set of inference rules is proposed to describe causal relations between the different types of arrhyth-
mia and IMD reactions, showing all premisses of each arrhythmia. These rules constitute an inference
engine that is executed in backward chaining, starting from the heart death event, allowing pathologists
to automate the generation of potential medical scenarios. Each scenario describes an ordered list of
dependent arrhythmia and IMD responses, showing the evolution of the health status of the patient until
he died. A generated medical scenario can, for example, demonstrate that an arrhythmia occurred or was
amplified due to an inappropriate response of the IMD.
Technical investigation During this step, attacks scenarios on the investigated IMD are reconstructed
starting from the collected technical evidence. A description of the initial system state of the IMD is gen-
erated by technical investigators, using an investigation library previously provided. The latter contains
a description of all simple attacks on IMDs and the actions executed by the IMD in response to remote
users’ actions or detected arrhythmia. A Model Checking based algorithm is developed in this paper to
automate the generation of potential attack scenarios starting from that library and a description of the
functions by which an IMD generates logs. A potential scenario generated by this Model Checker will
represent a series of actions (retrieved from the investigation library), which, if combined and executed,
would produce evidence that are similar to those collected from the IMD. To be considered as malicious,
an attack scenario should contain at least one malicious action Contrarily to the Model Checkers existing
in the literature, the one we are discussing in this paper is dedicated for the forensic investigation. It
generates scenarios in conformance with the collected evidence taking into consideration two categories
of actions: visible and invisible.
Correlating reconstructed medical and technical scenarios While the second step allows to generate
potential attack scenarios, it cannot be used to state that these scenarios are responsible of the patient’s
death. The objective of this step is to correlate the scenarios obtained by medical investigation and
the scenarios obtained by technical investigation. The aim is to prove that the malicious actions in the
technical scenarios of attacks caused the absence of reactions or the inappropriate reactions as shown in
the medical scenarios.
5 Techniques for postmortem investigation
In this section, we describe for each step of the investigation methodology the techniques to use.
5.1 Medical inference system
In the following, we describe an inference system for medical investigation. It uses the set of medical
inference rules, discussed in the previous subsection. These rules describe the causal relations between
events denoting types of arrhythmia and IMD reactions. An inference rule takes the following form
(Ev)n →T (Ev′)m, where n and m are positive non-zero integers. That rule means that the occurrence
of Ev for n times successively leads to the occurrence of Ev′ m times successively within a period of
time T . Event described in such a rule is a conjunction and/or disjunction of simple events that can be
classified into observable and unobservable events. Observable events are events that can be detected by
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Medical rules Descriptions
(1)V F, AR →T V F Rules (1) and (2) state that the occurrence of a Ventricular
Fibrillation (V F), to which the IMD does not respond (AR) or
responds inappropriately (IR), leads to the occurrence of another
episode of V F within the following period of time of length T
(2)V F, IR →T V F
(3)V F, AR →T HD Rules (3) and (4) are similar to rules (1) and (2), in the sense
that they use the same premises, but generate a consequence HD
instead of V F .(4)V F, IR →T HD
(5)V ES, AR →T V F Rules (5) and (6) state that the occurrence of a Ventricular
Extrasystole (V ES), to which the IMD does not respond, or
responds inappropriately, leads to the occurrence of a V F , within
a period of time of length T .
(6)V ES, IR →T V F
(7)V T, AR →T V F Rules (7) and (8) are similar to rules (5) and (6), respectively, in
the sense that the same consequences are generated using the
premise Ventricular Tachycardia (V T ) instead of V ES.(8)V T, IR →T V F
(9)V T, AR →T HD Rules (9), and (10) show for the same premises occurring in
rules (7) and (8), that HD can be another consequence.
(10)V T, IR →T HD
(11)ST, IR →T ST
Rules (11) states that the occurrence of a Sinus-Tachycardia
(ST ), to which the IMD does not respond (AR), leads to the
occurrence of another episode of ST , within the following period
of time of length T .
(12) (ST, IR)n →T V F
Rules (12) states that the repetitive occurrence of
Sinus-Tachycardia (ST ), followed by an inappropriate response
(IR) of the IMD, leads to the occurrence of a V F , within the
following period of time of length T .
Table 1: Example of medical rules and their description
the IMD under investigation and included in the collected medical evidence (e.g., ventricular fibrillation,
electric shocks). Unobservable events are events that are not detected by the IMD sensors, and therefore
cannot be included in the collected medical evidence (e.g., Acute Pulmonary Edema).
Due to the complexity of human body, a wide set of heart reactions, that are useful for the automated
generation of medical scenarios, could be identified and used to develop a large set of inference rules.
For the sake of space, we have only selected a non exhaustive set of 12 rules (rules 1 to 11 require the
occurrence of events one time only (m = n = 1)) described in Table 1.
5.2 Inferring medical scenarios
In order to infer the potential medical scenarios, pathologists execute the inference rules in backward
chaining starting from an observed heart death, which represents the last observed event in the medical
evidence, and the collected medical evidence. Several potential medical scenarios can be generated,
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creating a tree whose root node corresponds to an HD event. The tree of medical scenarios will be
reconstructed as follows. Assuming that Ev is an event in the reconstructed tree of medical scenarios,
and Ev′ is the last observable event in the scenario connecting DH to Ev in the tree (if Ev is observable
then Ev′ is equal to Ev), a rule in the form of E →T E ′ can be executed in backward chaining, unless the
following two conditions are met:
• The consequence E ′ in the rule corresponds to event Ev.
• If the premiss E is observable, it should correspond to the event immediately preceding Ev′ in the
medical evidence, and occurring no earlier than T .
Once the rule is executed, event E is appended to the tree under construction and E ′ is linked to E .
This process of reconstructions stops when: a) none of the inference rules can be executed; b) the
events in the reconstructed graph start to be older than a predefined threshold duration; and c) all recent
arrhythmia events in the medical evidence have been included in the tree.
5.3 Technical investigation
To reconstruct technical attack scenarios, investigators combine and execute actions from the library
of attacks to generate scenarios that could provide the same collected evidence. We describe in the
following the mechanisms by which a scenario is reconstructed. We start by formalizing the description
of an attack scenario, say ω , that we model in the form of ω = 〈s0, A1, s1, ..., sn−1, An, sn〉, where s0
is the initial system state, Ai (i ∈ [1.n]) represents elementary actions executed in the scenarios, and si
(i ∈ [0..n]) is a description of the intermediate system state generated after the execution of an action Ai.
To be executed, an action Ai should be enabled at state si−1, and once executed it generates state si. We
note that an action A in ω could be legitimate or malicious.
We denote by obs() an observation function over states, actions, and attack scenarios, which can
be used to describe any form of monitoring and security supervision mechanism deployed on the IMD.
The output of such a function denotes the observable part of action, state, or a scenario. It describes the
evidence that is typically generated further to noticing a new state, action, or scenario. With respect to
a security solution, an action or a state could be: a) Visible, in the sense that its value can be captured
by the observer; or b) Invisible, in the sense that none information regarding its occurrence could be
determined.
To compute obs(ω), first, we set obs(ω) as the sequence 〈obs(A1), ...,obs(An)〉, after replacing each
state action Ai by obs(Ai) and eliminating all states (we suppose that the security mechanisms deployed
on the IMD are event-based, and therefore only able to monitor events instead of supervising states).
Second, we set obs(ω) equal to obs(ω) after eliminating unobservable actions. We can notice that a
security solution is unable to log unobservable events nor detect their occurrence. From the investigation
point of view, two consecutive events in the generated evidence could be considered as two adjacent
events in the reconstructed scenario, or be separated by a series of unobservable events that could be
retrieved from the library of investigation.
To reconstruct attack scenarios, a Model Checking based algorithm is executed in forward chain-
ing as follows. Starting with a description of the IMD’s initial system state (supposed to be known
in advance, as we stated previously), the algorithm retrieves actions from the library and executes
them to generate potential scenarios that would produce the same provided evidence. Given a scenario
S = 〈s0,A1,s1, ...,Ai,si〉 under construction, such that obs(S) ⊑ E (i.e., the evidence expected to be gen-
erated by the IMD further to the occurrence of the scenario S is part of E , starting from the beginning of
file), the algorithm proceeds as follows. It checks whether there is an action A in the investigation library
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such that A is enabled in si. If yes, it executes A starting from state si to generate state s′ (s′ = A(s)).
Once s′ is generated, the algorithm checks if the evidence expected to be generate by the IMD, if the
scenario ω ′ = ω |〈A,s′〉 is executed, is part of E . If yes, it sets the scenario ω equal to ω |〈A,s′〉. As
this algorithm uses the Model Checking technique, it tries to execute any possible action from the li-
brary of investigation (as we described above), leading to the generation of a graph of technical scenarios
satisfying the provided evidence. Since the generation of scenarios is done with respect to the set of
collected evidences, the problem of state explosion is highly reduced since an observable action cannot
be selected from the library unless it is satisfied by the collected evidence (which contains also a finite
set of observed events and states).
5.4 Correlating potential scenarios
The two previous described techniques, i.e., the inference rules and the Model Checking, allow only
the generation of medical scenarios, and potential technical scenarios, respectively. Nevertheless, they
do not allow to prove at least one of the generated potential medical scenario is caused by one of the
generated potential technical scenarios, unless the two scenarios are correlated together. In fact, it may
happen that a medical scenario that lead to the death of the patient was caused by a displacement of IMD
leads (leading the IMD response to look inappropriate) and not by a malicious attack on the IMD. The
aim here is to show how correlation can be performed.
The opinion of the pathologist is important to validate the generated medical scenarios, and the
performed correlation between medical and technique scenarios, due to the following reasons. First,
the generated medical scenarios could contain unobservable events by the IMD. Second, patients are
different from each other and some of the generated medical scenarios could be unrealistic.
Correlation of scenarios is performed as follows. First, a potential medical scenario is examined to
check the existence of suspicious IMD responses (e.g., IR and/or AR), and identify the set of parameters
related to that response in the medical evidence (e.g., heart rate, arrhythmia duration, EMG amplitude).
Second, potential technical scenarios are analyzed to identify malicious actions threatening the security
of the IMD, and identify the modifications brought by them on the configuration, firmware, or battery
energy. Third, a correlation is performed to check whether one of the suspicious IMD responses identified
in the first step is caused by one of the malicious actions identified in the second step. If yes, it can be
proved that a potential attack scenario on the IMD under investigation was conducted and caused the
identified medical scenario (that lead to the patient death).
One example of correlation is described as follows. When examining the generated potential medical
scenario, a pathologist notices the existence of a set of IMD’s inappropriate responses (i.e., IR). In the
other side, the generated potential technical scenario showed a modification on the therapy settings.
Therefore, the pathologist decides to deeply analyze the provided technical evidence, and examine the
updated therapy parameters and their values. If he notices that the non-application of these updates would
have prevented the occurrence of the set of observed inappropriate responses, and thus the death of the
patient, then he can prove that the generated potential technical attack scenario conducted on the IMD
lead to the generated medical scenarios.
6 Case study
To exemplify the proposal, we present a case study related to the investigation of a lethal attack on
an IMD, where the results obtained at each step of the methodology are detailed and discussed. The
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investigated IMD is supposed to use an authentication protocol which is vulnerable to replay attacks. It
was impossible for us to find a real case study where a lethal attack was conducted on a patient’s IMD.
For that reason, the case study in this section was inspired from [18], which shows how a noise over-
sensing in an IMD can create adverse effect on health outcomes and mortality. We have introduced some
modifications to that scenario by replacing the noise over-sensing by the execution of an unauthorized
therapy modification on the IMD. It is important to mention that the analysis proposed in [18] does not
allow to cope with security issues.
6.1 Description of the conducted scenario
Description of the criminal attack scenario An adversary, who was able to acquire credentials used
to authenticate himself to an IMD, sent an authentication request to the IMD and succeeds in gaining
access. After that, he read the the patient’s health status, by examining the data stored in the IMD log.
Then, he modified the therapy settings, especially by altering the thresholds associated to the detection of
some arrhythmia. The IMD becomes unable to appropriately detect, identify, and respond to arrhythmia.
Later, the attacker disconnected.
Description of the medical incident Few hours after, the patient gets a Sinus-Tachycardia (ST ). Since
the IMD is misconfigured, such an event is detected as a Ventricular Fibrillation (V F). The IMD re-
sponds by delivering a significant electric shock. Due to the continuous inappropriate detection, the
same arrhythmia continues to happen and five other electric shocks were delivered additionally, among
them, the last one led to the occurrence of a true V F .
Faced to that V F , the IMD could not respond, since the maximum number of electric shocks (set by
the physician to 6), that can be delivered within a predefined period of time, has been reached. During
the consequent deactivation period successive episodes of V F occurred without being responded by the
IMD, leading to the patient death.
6.2 Postmortem analysis
During the postmortem investigation process, the set of techniques, which we described in Section 5, are
executed.
Medical and technical evidence collection Collection of technical evidence from the IMD revealed
four timestamped events that we describe in their order of appearance: T 1) Session opening further to a
successful authentication (user id and session identity are provided); T 2) modification of therapy settings
(new updated values are provided); and T 3) session closing (session identity is provided).
EMG history and IMD responses traces Collection of medical evidence revealed the following
events related to important arrhythmia and IMD responses, that we describe in their order of appear-
ance: M1) six successive episodes of ST , each one of them is immediately followed by a delivery of a
therapy suitable forV F; M2) several episodes of V F , whose intensity grew from an episode to another.
None of these instances of V F is followed by an IMD response (this corresponds to event AR); and M3)
heart death.
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Generation of potential medical scenarios Starting from the collected medical evidence, and based
on the set of inference rules described in Subsection 5.1, we generate one potential medical scenario as
follows. Starting with the last event M3, which represents a HD, rule (3) can be executed in backward
chaining, as the premisses of the rule correspond to M2. Later rule (1) is executed in backward chaining
a number of times equal to the instances of V F in event M2. Finally rule (12) is executed as its conse-
quence correspond to V F and its premisses are provided by M1. The output of the used inference system
is a medical scenario in the form of (M1, M2, M3).
Generation of technical attack scenarios Based on the provided traces collected from the IMD log
and the investigation library describing simple attacks targeting IMDs, two potential attack scenarios are
identified as follows.
In the first scenario, say S1, the attacker eavesdrop the credentials (action A1) exchanged through
messages that are weakly encrypted due to energy issues (use of a weak and lightweight encryption
algorithm, use of static keys). By brute-forcing these credentials, he authenticates himself to the IMD
(action A2). After successfully authenticating the attacker, the IMD opens a session (action A3). Then,
the attacker reads the stored medical data (action A4) (e.g., EMG history, therapy settings). Later, he
alters the therapy settings (action A5), and disconnects (action A6).
In the second scenario, say S2, the attacker intercepts the traffic (action A7) exchanged between the
IMD and the programmer, when a physician was consulting the IMD configuration. Later, he replays the
access request (action A8), and leads the IMD to open a session (action A3). Starting from the obtained
state, the attacker executes actions A4, A5, and A6 as in the scenario S1.
For the sake of space, we have not included the formal description of each one of the actions part of
the scenarios, nor provided the description of states separating two actions in the scenario. However, it
can be easily understood that each executed action prepares for the subsequent actions, and an action is
executed from the state where it is enabled. Moreover, as both of the scenarios contain malicious actions,
they could be considered as malicious scenarios.
Among the actions described above, actions A1, A2, A7, and A8 are unobservable by the IMD as
they target network resources, and therefore not included in the collected evidences. The same is true
for action A4 which is legitimate and does not look to be sensitive. Therefore, obs(S1) = obs(S2) =
〈A3,A5,A6〉. That observation corresponds exactly to events T 1, T 2, and T 3 available in the collected
technical evidence.
Correlation of the reconstructed scenarios Two cause/effect correlations allows to prove that each
one of the potential technical attack scenarios is the cause of the occurrence of the medical scenario.
Therefore the death of the patient could be considered as a consequence of a lethal attack on the IMD. The
first correlation is between action A5 (therapy modification) in the technical scenario, and inappropriate
IMD response provided by (M1) in the medical scenario. The second correlation is between A5 and
absence of IMD response provided by (M2) in the medical scenario. That correlation states that the
settings modified by A5 make the IMD unable to respond appropriately to the occurred arrhythmia.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we were interested in postmortem digital investigation of attacks on cardiac IMDs. First,
we identified a set of lethal attack scenarios targeting IMDs, and we proposed a methodology for the
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postmortem investigation analysis, which reconciles in the same framework conclusions derived by tech-
nical investigators and pathologists. Second, an inference system is described to provide an automated
reconstruction of medical scenarios staring from the medical evidence collected from the IMD under
investigation. These medical scenarios allow to identify and understand heart and device anomalies that
contributed to a patient death. Third, we proposed a formal investigation technique for the reconstruc-
tion of potential attack scenarios on IMDs, using an investigation library and a set of collected technical
evidence. A correlations is performed to prove the causality between the reconstructed technical and
medical scenarios.
In future work, we will extend the IMD architecture to support the generation and protection of a rich
set of evidential data, and the long-term energy-aware storage of these data. Another perspective would
consist in extending the proposed system to be tolerant to anti-forensic attacks.
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